2 shared objectives. The purpose of this paper is to outline these interests, examine how they achieve or conflict with the common goals of all parties involved, and then show how the MFO as a key implementing element of the Peace Treaty contributes to the overall goal of continuing the thirty-year peace between Israel and Egypt.
Continued security and stability in the Sinai Peninsula form an intersection of the national security interests between Egypt, Israel and the United States. For the Peace Treaty and the MFO to remain viable, the political, economic and security interests that Egypt and Israel have in common must be important enough to outweigh their competing interests. The U.S. has a dual role as both a mediator who exerts political pressure to push Israel and Egypt to cooperate in maintaining their shared interests, and acts as a partner whose interests both complement and conflict with a variety of individual goals among these two key regional allies.
Even though the last direct conflict between Israel and Egypt occurred in 1973, peacekeeping operations still play a vital role in maintaining stability throughout the Sinai Peninsula. Despite changes in the strategic environment such as regime change in Egypt, increasing regional instability that threatens Israel, and the perception of reduced U.S. regional influence, the MFO continues to play a pivotal role in Middle Eastern peace because it ensures the vital national security interests of the United States, Egypt and Israel.
The Changing Strategic Environment in the Sinai since 1982
Over the past three decades, the Sinai's strategic environment has grown more volatile and complex despite thirty-five years of peace between Egypt and Israel.
Conditions in this strategic key terrain have changed far beyond the vision of the drafters of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and the 1981 Security Protocol.
3 Consequently, these changes require an examination of the reasons why the Sinai still matters to regional security and the national security interests of the U.S., Israel and Egypt in 2013 and beyond. 3 The combination of difficult geography, internal Egyptian politics, changing demographics, and external regional influences make the Sinai more rather than less relevant to peace and stability in the Middle East.
As the nexus linking Africa with Asia and Europe with the Asia-Pacific through the Suez Canal, the geographic location of the Sinai Peninsula places it at the intersection of national interests for the U.S., Egypt and Israel. The Sinai is surrounded by strategically important waterways. At the western boundary of the peninsula, the Suez Canal carries 8% of the world's sea trade and is the source of almost $20 billion in much needed revenue for the Egyptian economy. 4 As a result, when the Suez Canal is closed by political or military actions, which has happened on several occasions, the international economy is severely affected. To the east, the Strait of Tiran at the Peninsula's southern tip is a key chokepoint that governs access to Eilat, Israel's only seaport on the Red Sea. Along with Egyptian forces moving into forward positions in the Sinai, any Egyptian blockade or mining of the Strait remains a stated "casus belli" for the Jewish State. 5 The Sinai Desert provides an essential buffer that neutralizes Egypt's ability to attack quickly into Israel, which was a key consideration that sparked Israel's occupation of the peninsula in 1956 and from 1967 to 1979. 6 Far from featureless, the desert offers natural obstacles with lines of high ground from the north and south and easily defendable passes that have proved decisive in battles for both the Egyptians and Israelis. 7 Israel and Egypt have used the Sinai as a major battleground in every In the future, Egypt will walk the fine line between its Islamist beliefs and goals such as Palestinian statehood, continued stable relations with Israel, and working toward internal political and economic stability.
Egypt's economy is cash-strapped and highly dependent on tourism, foreign aid, and loans from Western Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since 2000, insecurity has hurt the economy through loss of tourism, a lack of direct foreign investment, and disruptions in oil and natural gas exports. Confidence in Egypt's economic stability will return when the Morsi government can convince the International
Community that the security situation including in the Sinai is stable. International lenders and investors will continue to judge Egypt's worthiness for loans and other investment based on improving internal and external stability. 21 Despite the change to an Islamist-based government, the U.S. remains Egypt's biggest contributor of foreign aid. Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and the Egyptian Armed Forces receive almost 20% of their total budget and 80% of weapon systems acquisitions from the U.S. 22 Tied to the $1.55 billion in annual aid that the U.S. provides is a U.S. law that requires Egypt to adhere to the treaty with Israel. 23 Withdrawing from the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty would not only result in the loss of U.S. assistance but would also send a clear message to the international community that Egypt is not a safe investment. Because of Egypt's precarious economic situation and dependence on outside financial support, the government must continue to show it can effectively control its own territory in a stable and constructive manner. In the near term, breaking the Peace Treaty and sending the MFO from the Sinai would not be well received by the international community and would be seen as a major step backward for the new government.
The Sinai's proximity to key waterways, natural resources and western tourist destinations make it potentially a powerful economic engine in Egypt's stalled economy.
A cash-strapped Egypt cannot afford to cut off a lucrative means of drawing foreign currency and investment, but instability in the Sinai has done exactly that and threatens to cripple the economy if not controlled. 24 has allowed Hamas to use the Sinai as a safe haven from Israeli interference. 30 Ironically, the Egyptian government finds itself aligned with Israel's goal of increasing the security of the Sinai against Islamic extremists by reducing VEO and outside malign influence in the Sinai, and preventing attacks from Egyptian territory into Israel.
In the short-to mid-term (3-5 years), Egypt's national security interests of preventing armed conflict while solving internal political problems, preserving territorial sovereignty, stabilizing the Sinai, improving their economy and achieving regional leadership will be best served by respecting the 1979 Peace Treaty, supporting the MFO and cooperating with Israel. However, the Islamist government will need to walk a fine line both internally and diplomatically. Even though the Egyptian government has stated on several occasions that they intend to put the Peace Treaty to a popular referendum, Egyptian security forces continue to adhere to all terms of the Security Protocol, have secured MFO forces with Egyptian Security Forces, and have stepped up contact at all levels with the IDF. 31 Until President Morsi consolidates power, he must balance the pragmatic need for internal stability and economic prosperity with the desire to advance the Brotherhood's ideological principles.
Israeli Security Interests
Israel has felt a growing sense of insecurity as surrounding states become increasingly Islamist. President Netanyahu warned the Israeli public that the Arab Spring revolutions would be "Islamic, anti-Western, and most importantly, anti-Israel." Israeli security since the end of the Yom Kippur War has depended upon maintaining tense but predictable relationships with surrounding Arab governments. 34 The loss of authoritarian but stable rule in Egypt and potentially in Syria is a serious, destabilizing situation for a state that sees itself without readily defendable borders. President Netanyahu has publically restated the importance of the Treaty to both Israel and Egypt in maintaining regional security. 39 The Israeli government declared that they expect Egypt to adhere to the Peace Treaty. On several recent occasions, Israel has agreed to temporary adjustments to the terms of the Security Protocols called "Agreed Activity Mechanisms" that allow Egypt to address security threats in the Sinai with military forces that are normally not allowed into the areas immediately adjacent to the Israeli border. 40 In August 2012, Egypt demonstrated this flexibility through an air attack on Jihadist terrorists operating in the north Sinai--the first use of air power on the Peninsula since 1973 and closely coordinated with and monitored by the Israelis. This was an instance of both sides pursuing pragmatism over principle. The Israeli hope is that this kind of security cooperation will continue with the current Egyptian Islamist government. 41 Israel is dependent upon Egypt to contain VEOs and the transport of weapons through the Sinai to Gaza. With the security vacuum caused by the change in the Egyptian government, the plethora of tunnels to Gaza, and Hamas looking for strategic depth and sanctuary away from IDF interdiction, the Sinai has become a safe haven and staging area for Islamist terrorist groups launching attacks at both the Egyptian Security Forces and into Israel. 42 Egyptian and Israeli cooperation concerning the Sinai has continued despite the change of regime in Cairo, using the MFO structure to share information, resolve potential conflicts and reduce misunderstandings that are now rising to unprecedented levels since January 2012. 43 
United States Interests in the Sinai
The "Defense Strategic Guidance" published in January 2012 states that the U.S.
intends to rebalance America's focus to the Asian-Pacific region, but it also acknowledges the vital and important interests that will endure in the Middle East. As the U.S. advances important interests such as protecting the global commons, enhancing regional stability, and continuing the fight against extreme violence, providing for Israel's security while working towards a comprehensive Middle East peace remains a top priority. 45 The Recognizing the vulnerability of the MFO in an unstable region, the danger to the Peace Treaty, and Cairo's challenges to restoring security in the Sinai, the U.S. 65 The MFO has been a tremendous success, but it cannot be a permanent, never-ending fixture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether the MFO continues to operate in the Sinai to celebrate a fortieth anniversary, the MFO or any peacekeeping operation must ultimately be judged a failure if it doesn't work toward to a permanent peace without the need for outside forces. This is outside the scope of this paper, except to acknowledge that a framework 
